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LARGE SHAREHOLDER DIVERSIFICATION AND CORPORATE RISK-TAKING
Mara Faccio1, Maria-Teresa Marchica2 and Roberto Mura2

ABSTRACT
Using new data for the universe of firms covered in Amadeus, we reconstruct the equity portfolios of
shareholders who hold equity stakes in private and publicly-traded European firms. We find great
heterogeneity in the degree of portfolio diversification across large shareholders. Exploiting this
heterogeneity, we document that firms controlled by diversified large shareholders undertake riskier
investments than firms controlled by non-diversified large shareholders. The impact of large shareholder
diversification on corporate risk-taking is both economically and statistically significant. Our results have
important implications at the policy level because they identify one channel through which policy changes
aimed at improving capital market development and diversification can improve economic welfare.
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This paper provides direct evidence that firms controlled by non-diversified large shareholders
invest more conservatively than firms controlled by well diversified large shareholders. The impact of
large shareholder diversification on corporate risk-taking is both statistically and economically
meaningful.
The effect of portfolio diversification on corporate risk-taking has important macroeconomic
implications. Prior macroeconomic studies have shown that entrepreneurs’ willingness to take risks in the
pursuit of profitable opportunities is a fundamental underpinning of long term economic growth (Barro,
1991, Baumol, Litan, and Schramm, 2007, DeLong and Summers, 1991). Sustained growth, in turn,
results in higher levels of economic development. From a macroeconomic perspective, understanding the
determinants of risk-taking helps to identify channels through which policy changes can improve
economic welfare.
This study has also related implications for the microeconomic literature that uses ownership
concentration as a proxy for shareholder portfolio diversification. A central theme in this literature is that
if their wealth is largely concentrated in the firms they own, risk-averse owners will seek to avoid risk
more than they would had they held a diversified portfolio.1 In this literature, authors have used
ownership concentration as a proxy for both well diversified and undiversified investors, making
diametrically opposed assumptions about diversification, neither of which presumption is based on hard
evidence.2,3 Ironically, these studies have reached mixed conclusions. Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that
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Alternatively, one could argue that insiders who choose to keep their wealth undiversified are risk-lovers (Carroll,
2000) so that portfolio concentration should be positively associated with insiders’ willingness to invest in riskier
projects.
2
Anderson and Reeb (2003) provide some evidence that controlling families typically hold undiversified portfolios.
Their evidence, however, is limited to those families that appear in Forbes’ Wealthiest Americans Survey.
3
In the agency literature, studies have focused more specifically on managers’ risk-avoidance behavior in corporate
investment decisions due to reputational concerns (Holmstrom and Ricart i Costa, 1986, and Hirshleifer and Thakor,
1992) or to their undiversified human capital (Amihud and Lev, 1981, Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987). Those papers
focus on managers’ incentives to lower risk and on the consequent conflict of interests between managers and
shareholders.
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the presence of block positions held by founder families, whom they assume to be undiversified investors,
is surprisingly associated with higher operating risk. In contrast, Amihud and Lev (1981) find that risk
reducing investments such as diversifying acquisitions, are less likely when a large blockholder, whom
they assume to be a more diversified investor, is present. In a more recent study, John, Litov, and Yeung
(2008) find no significant relation between ownership concentration and corporate risk-taking. The
evidence presented in this study provides future researchers with new information regarding appropriate
assumptions about shareholder diversification.
To investigate the impact of large shareholder diversification on corporate risk-taking, we exploit
the data available in Amadeus to reconstruct the stock portfolios of a large panel of shareholders who hold
equity stakes in privately-held and publicly-traded European firms. We reconstruct the portfolio for all
shareholders of each firm with ownership data in Amadeus, for a total of 1,315,558 shareholder-year
observations. For each company, we assume that a company’s largest (ultimate) shareholder has enough
power to control the firm’s investment decisions.4 We estimate both cross-sectional and panel regressions
to investigate the relation between owners’ portfolio diversification and corporate risk-taking. We use
three proxies to measure diversification for each company’s largest shareholder: (i) the (natural log of the)
number of firms in which this investor holds shares across all countries in our sample; (ii) the Herfindhal
index of wealth concentration; (iii) and the (natural log of the) number of different 4-digit primary SIC
code sectors in which the companies in the largest shareholder’s portfolio operate. Our primary measure
of firm riskiness is the volatility of firm-level profitability over a given 5-year period. Profitability is
measured as a firm’s return on assets (ROA).
We find strong statistical evidence that firms controlled by non-diversified large shareholders
invest more conservatively than firms controlled by well diversified large shareholders. Further, and more
importantly, the economic impact of large shareholder diversification on risk-taking is non-negligible.
Across all cross-sectional specifications, on average, an increase in the level of the largest shareholder’s
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The data supports our assumption; in our sample, on average, the largest shareholder controls 63.96% of votes,
clearly enough to give her effective control.
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portfolio diversification from the first to the third quartile of the distribution results in an 8.94% increase
in the volatility of ROA. The results are qualitatively similar when we analyze three alternative proxies
for firm risk-taking: the likelihood of survival, the difference between the maximum and minimum ROA,
and the volatility of return on equity. The results are also robust to using alternative proxies for portfolio
diversification.
The positive association between portfolio diversification and corporate risk-taking persists in our
panel regression analysis, which includes shareholder fixed-effects. Such a framework has the benefit of
controlling for any investor-specific (time-invariant) omitted variables.
While we cannot fully eliminate concerns of endogeneity with non-experimental data, we take a
number of steps to corroborate the claim that portfolio diversification has a causal impact on corporate
risk-taking. First, we show that, in part because of the predominance of privately-held firms in our
sample, on average the largest shareholder controls a super-majority of votes. As such, large shareholders
control corporate choices.5 Second, we run a number of tests using a sub-sample of start-up firms. For
start-ups, it is undoubtedly the founder-shareholder who explicitly chooses her desired level of firm risktaking. We show that firms started by investors who hold diversified portfolios are riskier than firms
started by non-diversified founders. Thus, if all existing shareholders were non-diversified, we would
observe a lower level of risk-taking among start-ups. In turn, as proposed in the economic development
literature, there would be less long term growth in the economy.
Our results have important policy implications. A rich literature has emphasized the importance
of developed capital markets as a key factor in stimulating economic growth. This literature goes back at
least to Schumpeter (1912). More recent studies include, but are not limited to, Beck, Levine and Loayza
(2000), Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) and Rajan and Zingales (1998). Further, studies cited above (Barro,
1991, Baumol et al., 2007, DeLong and Summers, 1991) have shown that risk-taking is a fundamental
determinant of long term economic growth. In this study, we show that diversification (at the shareholder
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94.61% of the firms in our sample are privately-held. The largest shareholders’ dominance within their firms is
discussed in detail in section III.
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portfolio level) is conducive to more corporate risk-taking. To the extent that the presence of more
developed capital markets allows investors to achieve higher levels of diversification, our results point to
a channel through which policy changes can have a positive impact on economic welfare. Specifically,
policies that promote capital market development and facilitate investors’ portfolio diversification are
likely to promote corporate risk-taking.
This paper relates in general to the literature investigating the determinants of risk-taking.
Djankov, Ganser, McLiesh, Ramalho, and Shleifer (2009) show that corporate taxes have a large adverse
impact on entrepreneurial activities. Djankov et al. (2009) and John et al. (2008) show that better
protection of property rights has a positive effect on the propensity to start up new businesses and on
corporate risk-taking. Morck, Wolfenzon, and Yeung (2005) survey the literature on the consequences of
wealth concentration in an economy on the allocation of capital, innovation, and economic growth. The
authors discuss how wealth concentration in an economy may lead insiders to augment rent-seeking and
to curtail investment in innovation. We highlight an additional determinant of risk-taking -- the extent of
diversification of a controlling shareholder’s portfolio.
Finally, our study relates to a large literature on the economic behavior of firms. Our empirical
analysis allows us to assess the validity of some stylized assumptions in this literature. A typical
assumption is that corporate insiders are not well diversified. Examples of such studies include Anderson
and Reeb (2003), John et al. (2008), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), and Stulz (2005).6 Our study adds to this
literature in two ways. First, while we provide hard evidence that the typical large shareholder is
undiversified,7 we also document a high degree of heterogeneity across large shareholders. There are in
fact many cases in which the largest shareholder is very well diversified, holding stakes in hundreds of
6

A limited number of papers have made the opposite claim, e.g., that large shareholders hold somewhat diversified
portfolios (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976, and Amihud and Lev, 1981). Limited empirical evidence that at least
some large shareholders are well diversified is found in the literature on business groups (Bertrand, Johnson,
Samphantharak and Schoar, 2008, Bertrand, Metha and Mullainathan, 2002, Faccio, Lang and Young, 2001, Khanna
and Yafeh, 2005, Morck, 2005).
7
In the U.S., the portfolios of households investing in the private equity market also appear to be quite concentrated
(Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002). Further evidence of a general lack of portfolio diversification for small
individual investors is reported in Barber and Odean (2000), Goetzmann and Kumar (2008), Karhunen and
Keloharju (2001).
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firms. Second, while we find some empirical support for the trade-off between holding a dominant
position in a relatively large firm and achieving a reasonable degree of portfolio diversification (Demsetz
and Lehn, 1985), we find that the correlation between ownership concentration and portfolio
diversification is relatively low. For example, the correlation coefficient between ownership concentration
and the number of firms in which a company’s largest shareholder holds shares is -0.31. This means that,
while shareholders who hold large ownership stakes in a firm tend to be less diversified than shareholders
who hold smaller stakes, this relation is relatively weak. This result suggests that caution should be
exercised when ownership concentration is used as a proxy for the degree of an individual’s presumed
portfolio diversification, as many large (small) shareholders are in fact well (poorly) diversified.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I we describe the data sources used.
Section II presents descriptive statistics as well as the results of regressions of risk-taking variables
against our measures of large shareholder’s portfolio diversification. Section III addresses endogeneity
concerns. Section IV presents the results of various robustness tests. Section V summarizes our findings
and concludes.
I.

Data

To address our question, we gather (direct) ownership and accounting data for all companies
included in “Amadeus top 250,000.” Amadeus is one of the Bureau van Dijk Electronic Publishing’s
databases. This database includes European privately-held and publicly-traded companies that satisfy the
following criteria. For France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Spain, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom,
Amadeus top 250,000 includes all companies with revenues of at least €15m, or total assets of at least
€30m, or at least 200 employees. For the other countries, it includes all companies with operating
revenues of at least €10m, or total assets of at least €20m, or at least 150 employees. The database
excludes companies with operating revenues per employee or total assets per employee of less than
€1,000. Disclosure requirements in Europe require private companies to submit their annual accounting
and ownership data, so that this information is publicly available. However, some limitations exist. For
example, in Portugal and Germany many companies fail to comply with the filing requirements. In
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Bosnia, Macedonia, Russia, Serbia & Montenegro, Switzerland, and Ukraine, publication is not required.
As a consequence, the number of companies with available data is limited in these countries. In Austria,
the disclosure of financial information only covers a few basic items for small and medium sized
enterprises.
A.

Risk-taking Variables
Our primary measure of corporate risk-taking behavior is the country-adjusted volatility of firm

profitability, σ(ROA). Profitability is measured by the firm’s return on assets (

), defined as the ratio

of earnings before interests and taxes to total assets. For each year, we compute the difference between a
firm’s ROA and the average ROA across all non-financial firms in the country in which the company is
registered. By removing the influence of the home country’s economic cycle, we have a cleaner measure
of the level of risk resulting from corporate decisions. In the cross-sectional regressions, we calculate the
standard deviation of the adjusted returns for each firm over the entire sample period (1999-2007),
requiring a minimum of 5 observations. This approach is similar to the procedure used by John et al.
(2008). In the panel regressions, we measure performance volatility over 5-year over-lapping periods
(1999-2003, 2000-2004, 2001-2005, 2002-2006, and 2003-2007).
B.

Ownership and Wealth Diversification Variables
For each company that has available ownership data, we identify all ultimate shareholders. That

is, whenever the direct shareholder of a firm is another firm, we identify its owners, the owners of its
owners, and so on. If a shareholder i owns a fraction

of the shares of firm Y, which owns a fraction

of the shares of firm J, we measure shareholder i’s control over voting rights in J (Ultimate Control)
by the weakest link along the chain, i.e., the minimum of

and

.8 A clear improvement in this

calculation over prior studies is that Amadeus provides information on the ownership of private, as well as
public firms, which allows us to trace the ownership of unlisted companies. Overall, the data used to

8

This approach was earlier used by Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002). Consistent
with the procedure used in those papers, we trace ownership of pyramids of any length.
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calculate the ownership and diversification variables discussed in this section include 1,315,558
shareholder-year observations.
After tracing each ownership stake to its ultimate shareholders, we identify the shareholder
controlling the largest fraction of voting rights in each firm, whom we label as the firm’s Largest
Ultimate Shareholder. The ownership, control, and diversification variables employed throughout the
paper always refer to each firm’s largest ultimate shareholder. We focus on the shareholder controlling
the largest fraction of voting rights in the firm because control of voting rights indicates more power in
corporate decision making.
For each shareholder, we also compute the cash flow rights in the firm’s earnings. Using the
example above, if a shareholder i owns a fraction

of the shares of firm Y, which owns a fraction

of the shares of firm J, then i will be entitled to a fraction

of the cash flows of J, which we

label Ultimate Ownership. Because a high level of ownership serves to align the controlling shareholder’s
incentives with those of minority shareholders, later in the paper we use the ownership variable to address
the possibility that some of our results may in fact reflect tunneling.
We develop three proxies of portfolio diversification for each largest shareholder. The first
measure, Ln No. Firms, is the natural log of the number of companies in which a company’s largest
ultimate shareholder holds shares, directly or indirectly, in a given year, across all countries in our
sample. We build this variable exploiting all information available in Amadeus, including ownership in
companies for which Amadeus does not disclose any accounting data. We only require that, for a given
year, based on the data in Amadeus, we are able to identify a particular investor as one of the ultimate
shareholders of a given firm in a specific year. A firm is considered part of the shareholder’s portfolio
regardless of the size of the investor’s stake in that firm.
The second proxy for portfolio diversification is the Herfindhal Index, a measure of wealth
concentration for the portfolio owned by each firm’s largest ultimate shareholder. To compute this index,
we first calculate the dollar value of the investment made by a given shareholder in each firm in her

8

portfolio, as the book value of equity of that company,
ownership stake in that given firm,

, multiplied by the shareholder’s ultimate

. Because we have both public and private companies in the

sample, we have to rely on book values for this calculation. Additionally, in the calculation of the
Herfindhal Index we can include only firms with available data for the book value of equity.9 After
computing the value of a shareholder’s investment in each firm in her portfolio, we sum the value of these
investments to obtain the shareholder’s total wealth,

∑

·

. Next, we compute the

incidence of the investment in each firm in the shareholder’s portfolio, as the ratio of the value of the
investment made in that given firm over the shareholder’s total wealth,

·

. The Herfindhal Index is the sum of the squared values of these weights, ∑

/ ∑

·

. The index

ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating that all wealth is invested in one firm (fully concentrated wealth),
and 0 indicating a well a totally diversified portfolio. To ease the interpretation of our results, in the
regressions we use (1-Herfindhal Index) as an independent variable, so that a higher value of the index
denotes a more diversified portfolio.
The third proxy for portfolio diversification, Ln No. Sectors, is the natural log of the number of 4digit primary SIC code sectors for the firms in the largest shareholder’s portfolio.
In the calculation of all ownership or portfolio diversification variables discussed in this section,
we include ownership in (1) privately-held and publicly-traded firms; (2) domestic and foreign firms; and
(3) non-financial as well as financial firms. We also include both minority as well as dominant equity
stakes held by large shareholders. Despite the wide coverage of firms, some limitations nevertheless exist.
First, we capture equity investments, but we miss other significant investments, such as in bonds and real
estate. Second, due to Amadeus’s coverage, we are unable to include equity investments in firms
incorporated outside Europe. Given the well known home bias of investors, this limitation is likely to be

9

We exclude companies with negative book value of equity. As with the Ln No. Firms proxy, we include companies
that are controlled through pyramids. This leads to some double counting, because the value of a firm controlled
through a pyramid is counted once in the equity value of that firm itself, and it is counted again in the equity value
of its parent. In unreported tests, we find that our results are robust to the exclusion of firms controlled through
pyramids.
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inconsequential. Third, we are unable to track investments in smaller companies that are not covered in
Amadeus. Given that these companies are small, their exclusion is unlikely to have a major impact on our
value-based portfolio concentration measures, such as the Herfindhal index.
C.

Control Variables
As control variables, we use: (1) Size, defined as the natural log of total assets (in thousands

US$), expressed in 1999 prices,10 where total assets is the sum of fixed assets (tangible and intangible
fixed assets and other fixed assets) and current assets (inventory, receivables,and other current assets). (2)
Leverage, defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, where total debt includes non-current liabilities
(long term debt and other non-current liabilities) and current liabilities (loans, accounts payable and
others). (3) Profitability, measured by the firm’s return on assets (ROA), defined as the ratio of EBIT to
total assets. (4) Sales Growth, calculated as the annual growth rate of sales. All variables are measured at
the first year-end of the sample period over which the volatility of earnings is measured. In all crosssectional tests, we also include country and industry fixed effects. In the panel analysis, we instead
include shareholder and year fixed effects.
D.

Data Quality and Selection Criteria

D.1. Ownership Data
The ownership data that we use to compute ultimate ownership, ultimate control, and the
shareholder diversification variables are gathered by Amadeus from a variety of sources: official bodies,
associated information providers (i.e., Jordans for Ireland and the U.K.; Coface for France; Lexis-Nexis
for the Netherlands), and directly from the companies themselves. Our sample starts in 1999 because that
is the year in which Amadeus started using a unique identifier for each corporate shareholder in the
database. The identifier minimizes the chances of classification errors. The ownership sample ends in
2003 since we require 5 subsequent years of data to compute the risk-taking variables.
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Using country CPI data from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics.
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Because of data constraints, the procedure we use to identify a company’s ultimate shareholders
differs slightly from that used in Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002). There are three
main differences. First, we exclude companies that exhibit cross-holdings in their ownership structure
because the identification of ultimate owners is not always obvious.11 We also exclude shareholders who
are labelled “private shareholder,” “private citizen,” or “legal person” in Amadeus; these shareholders
cannot be traced back to a specific individual.12 (However, we keep the companies in which they own
shares in the sample, and we track the ownership of all remaining shareholders.) Finally, because of the
size of our sample, we are unable to aggregate investments by members of the same family; thus, each
individual is treated separately.
Further, on the basis of ownership categories reported in Amadeus, and on the basis of a careful
analysis of the owners’ names, we identify firms in which the Government is a shareholder.13,14 We
exclude these firms from the analysis because the motivations for government intervention in the
economy and governments’ risk-taking preferences are typically different from those of private investors.
After these filters, we are left with ownership data for 1,198,372 shareholder-year observations, which
include 243,856 different firms. These screening criteria are summarized in Appendix A, Panel A.
To assess the quality of the ownership data in Amadeus, we compare the stake held by the largest
direct shareholder, as reported in Amadeus, with the same information from alternative sources. We check
data from three markets for which the collection of ownership data from online sources is relatively easy:
Italy, Spain, and the U.K. For each of these countries, we collect year-end data for 2007 for a sample of
100 firms. For Italy, we obtain official data for publicly-traded firms from the Italian Stock Exchange.15

11

This is unlikely to affect our analysis since the total number of cross-held firm-year observations is only 2,890.
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These are 41,878 shareholder-year observations.

13

We check whether the shareholder’s name reported by Amadeus contains terms such as “Ministry”, “State of”,
“Government”, “Treasury”, “Council”, in different languages.

14
15

These are 24,482 firm-year observations.
http://www.borsaitaliana.it/frame/torna.jsp?src=http://www.consob.it/main/emittenti/societa_quotate/index.html
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For Spain, the official data are from the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores.16 For the U.K., the
data come from the Hemscott-Corporate Register.17
For these companies, we compute the correlation coefficient between the ownership of the largest
shareholder as reported in Amadeus and that reported in the alternative sources. The overall correlation
coefficient is 0.87. Although this coefficient appears to be reasonably high, two caveats are in order. First,
the ownership data in Amadeus appears to be noisier in the U.K. In particular, while the correlation
coefficient between the ownership of the largest shareholder as reported in Amadeus and that reported in
the alternative sources is 0.89 for the Spanish sample, and 0.83 for the Italian sample, it is only 0.67 for
the U.K. sample. These discrepancies are due, at least in part, to differences in the dates on which
ownership changes are recorded in the different data sources. Additionally, because the market for
corporate control is relatively more liquid in the U.K., one would expect to find more discrepancies in the
U.K. ownership data across different sources. To address this potential problem, we show in our
robustness tests that our results are robust to the exclusion of U.K. firms. The second caveat is that in
some cases, the name of the largest direct shareholder as reported in Amadeus does not match the name in
the official data sources. Unfortunately, given the size of the database, it is not possible to manually check
all entries. However, we have no reason to think that this inconsistency in the ownership data would result
in anything other than noise in the data. Thus, if anything, it should bias against finding significant
results.
D.2. Accounting Data
We gather accounting data for all non-financial18 firms having data available for both total assets
and EBIT for at least one year during 1999-2007. This results in an initial “accounting” sample of
1,754,714 firm-year observations. We use two tests to assess the accuracy of these data.

16

http://www.cnmv.es/Portal/consultas/DerechosVoto/BusquedaEntidad.aspx

17

http://www.hemscott.com/

18

We include investments in financial firms (e.g., companies with a primary 4-digit SIC between 6000 and 6999) in
calculating ultimate control, ownership, and portfolio diversification. However, financial firms are excluded from
subsequent analyses because their risk-taking behavior is heavily influenced by regulation.
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First, for a random sample of 250 publicly-traded companies covered in Amadeus, we collect data
on “total assets” at year-end 2007 from Datastream. We then compute the correlation coefficient between
the total assets as reported in Amadeus for 2007 and that reported in Datastream. The correlation
coefficient is 0.93. Further, for a sample of 250 privately-held firms, we gather data on total assets at
year-end 2007 from OneSource, a database which contains a limited amount of basic information for
more than half a million public and private businesses across nineteen European countries.19 We then
compute the correlation coefficient between the total assets as reported in Amadeus and that reported in
OneSource. The correlation coefficient is 0.98. Based on these calculations, we conclude that the
accounting data in Amadeus appear to be as reliable as the data available from alternative sources.
Further, we use a number of accounting identities to minimize the loss of observations due to
missing data and to identify possible data errors. For example, when fixed assets is missing, we compute
it by summing “intangible fixed assets,” “tangible fixed assets,” and “other fixed assets;” similarly, we
compute “current assets” by summing “current assets stocks” (inventory), “current assets debtors”
(receivables), and “other current assets.” If the value of fixed assets or current assets is missing in
Amadeus, but we are able to compute it using one of the accounting identities, we use the computed
value.
To ensure the accuracy of the accounting variables, we compare them to values computed using
accounting identities. We eliminate observations whenever the Amadeus value and the computed value
differ by more than 5 percent. This process affects only a small number of observations, but it is
important to remove possible data errors. In a number of cases, we discover a small difference between
the Amadeus value and the computed value. Further verification indicates that this difference is usually
due to Amadeus adding or dropping decimals, and is thus not consequential. When this occurs, we use the
figures originally reported in Amadeus. To further reduce the impact of outliers, across all analyses,
accounting variables other than sales growth and leverage are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% of the

19

http://www.onesource.com
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distribution. As sales growth and leverage exhibit large positive skewness, these two variables are
winsorized at the bottom 1% and at the top 5% of the distribution. 20
We then restrict the sample to companies with data available for both total assets and EBIT for at
least 5 years, because a 5-year period is required to compute the volatility of ROA, our main dependent
variable. These requirements reduce the sample to 1,208,666 firm/year observations from 168,193 firms.
After merging these data with the ownership data sample, we retain only firms that meet two criteria.
First, the firm must have enough data to compute the volatility of ROA for at least one period (t,t+4), i.e.,
at least 5 years of accounting data. And second, for each of these 5 year periods, the firm must have
ownership data at the first year-end. Applying these criteria reduces the sample to 332,301 firm/year
observations from 50,049 firms. Finally, we exclude firms with no data for the main control variables,
leaving us with a final sample of 123,642 firm/year observations from 46,692 firms for the main crosssectional and panel tests. These selection criteria are summarized in Appendix A, Panels B and C.

II.

Results

A. Univariate Results
Table I reports descriptive statistics for all non-financial firms included in the panel regressions.
This sample includes 123,642 firm-year observations. In Panel A, we provide information on the country
distribution of observations. Although our sample includes at least two firms from 30 different countries,
three countries represent an overwhelming fraction of the sample: the United Kingdom (27.39%), France
(25.12%), and Spain (15.65%).
[Table I goes here]
In Panel B, we report descriptive statistics for the sample. The mean (median) 5-year volatility of
ROA is 0.055 (0.044), with a standard deviation of 0.042. On average, the largest shareholder holds a
stake in 4 firms. Thus, large shareholders are moderately diversified. This figure is similar to estimates

20

The results are qualitatively similar if we trim observations at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution, or
winsorize all variables at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution.
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reported in Barber and Odean (2000), Goetzmann and Kumar (2008), and Karhunen and Keloharju
(2001); they show that an average investor (not necessarily a blockholder) holds equity in 2-7 publiclytraded firms. A comparable level of diversification is documented by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen
(2002) for U.S. households investing in the private equity market. The distribution of our portfolio
diversification variable is relatively skewed. The median large shareholder in the sample is totally nondiversified, holding a stake in only 1 firm. However, 43.55% of investors are at least somewhat
diversified, holding equity in two or more companies. In fact, 14.75% of investors hold stakes in 5
companies or more; 6.63% of investors hold equity in 10 companies or more; 0.87% of investors hold
equity in 50 firms or more; finally, 0.34% of investors hold equity in over 100 firms. Some shareholders
are extremely diversified, holding stake in as many as 972 firms. Thus, it is hard to make generalizations
about large shareholders’ level of portfolio diversification.
An alternative measure of portfolio diversification is (1-Herfindhal Index), for which a higher
value denotes more diversification. For (1-Herfindhal Index), the highest possible value, 1, denotes
perfect diversification, and the lowest possible value, 0, denotes no diversification at all. In our sample,
the mean value of (1- Herfindhal Index) is 0.174. This value is relatively low, which means that although
the average large shareholder holds equity stakes in four different firms, most of her wealth is
concentrated in one of them. To give an example, if the average largest shareholder instead invested
equally in the 4 firms, (1- Herfindhal Index) would equal 0.75. A coefficient of 0.174 is consistent with a
shareholder putting about 91% of her wealth in one company and distributing the rest equally among the
remaining 3 firms. Not all investors are the same, however: in fact, while many investors are totally nondiversified, some others are extremely well diversified.
We find that investors tend to diversify across industries, not just across firms. The average
investor holds equity in 2.13 different industries. The most diversified shareholder in the sample holds
equity in 232 different sectors.
The sample includes both very large and small firms. The typical firm is highly levered, with an
average (median) leverage ratio of 67.5% (70.5%). Companies appear to be relatively profitable, with an
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average ROA of 7.1%. The sample firms exhibit a wide range of growth rates, with a mean (median)
annual rate of growth of sales of 25.1% (9%).
On average, the largest shareholder owns 62.29% of a company’s cash flow rights (i.e., is entitled
to 62.29% of the dividends), and controls 63.96% of voting rights. Thus, the largest blockholders are
indeed very large and influential investors. This raises the question of whether large investors are more or
less likely to hold diversified portfolios than small investors. Our evidence suggests a tradeoff between
owning a large fraction of cash flow rights and being able to hold a diversified portfolio. We find a
negative correlation between the fraction of cash flow rights owned by the largest shareholder and the
diversification level of her portfolio. However, the correlation coefficient between ultimate ownership and
the number of firms in which a large shareholder holds equity is only -0.31. Similarly, we find a
correlation of -0.32 between ultimate ownership and (1- Herfindhal Index), and a correlation of -0.34
between ultimate ownership and the number of sectors in which a large shareholder holds equity.
B. Regression Analysis
To analyze the economic impact of the largest shareholder’s portfolio diversification on corporate
risk-taking, we present two main sets of tests. The first set includes ordinary least squares cross sectional
regressions of (country-adjusted) volatility of firm-level profitability,

, against proxies for large

shareholder diversification, along with a number of variables, xnj, that control for other determinants of
risk-taking that might otherwise induce spurious correlations. (In particular, we control for leverage,
profitability, sales growth, and firm size.) In a similar vein to John et al., (2008), we isolate firms for
which we have a minimum of five years of ROA data over 1999-2007. For these companies, we then
compute the standard deviation of the (country-adjusted) ROA over all the available data points.
Therefore, for each firm, we generate a single observation of

. The control variables are

measured, for each firm, at the first available year-end (or, for the flow variables, during the first year).
Our regression equation is:
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In all cross-sectional regressions we include industry (Industry F.E.) and country fixed-effects (Country
F.E.).
The second set of regression tests uses a panel of observations to investigate how the volatility of
firm earnings changes in response to changes in the largest shareholder’s portfolio diversification. The
panel regressions allow us to control for unobservable shareholder-specific characteristics that impact the
largest shareholder’s risk-taking decisions by using fixed effects. For example, it is possible that the effect
of risk-aversion on risk-taking depends not only on the dominant shareholder’s level of portfolio
diversification,21 but also on the dominant shareholder’s utility function. Shareholder-fixed effects
control, among other things, for differences in the shareholder-specific utility function. More generally,
the use of a panel of data, alongside the inclusion of fixed effects allows us to control for any shareholder
specific characteristic which may be correlated with the omitted explanatory variables. Controlling for
shareholder fixed effects helps reduce the omitted variable bias which would render our estimated
coefficients biased and inconsistent (Wooldridge, 2002). In this second set of tests, our regression
equation is:

σ

, ,

+

+
+ Shareholder . . +
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+

. .

An alternative test of risk-aversion would be to look at the correlation between the firm’s weight in the investor’s
, and the volatility of the firm’s earnings. By construction, this variable is highly correlated with
portfolio,
portfolio diversification; non-diversified shareholders by definition invest 100% of their wealth in the only firm they
control. Therefore, we do not use include this variable in the regressions in which we control for shareholder
diversification. As reported in the robustness tests section, we find that risk-taking is lower among firms having
larger weights in large shareholders’ portfolios.

17

(2)

Large Shareholder Diversification
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is the proxy for large shareholder diversification; xnjt are controls for

profitability

that
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Shareholder . . are shareholder fixed effects, and
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induce
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correlations;

. . are year fixed effects.

[Table II goes here]
The results for the cross-sectional tests are reported in Table II. In these tests, the standard
deviation of the firm’s ROA is the dependent variable. In the first regression, our measure of shareholder
diversification is Ln No. Firms, the natural log of the number of companies in which a company’s largest
ultimate shareholder holds shares. In the second specification, we use (1- Herfindhal Index), and in the
third we use Ln No. Sectors, the natural log of the number of 4-digit primary SIC code sectors for the
firms in the largest shareholder’s portfolio. In all three specifications, a higher value of the independent
variable reflects a higher degree of portfolio diversification.
The results for all three specifications indicate that shareholder diversification is positively and
significantly related to firm risk-taking. All three coefficients on the shareholder diversification variables
are positive, with a p-value of less than 0.001. This result provides direct and robust statistical evidence
that well diversified large shareholders are willing to accept greater firm-level risk. The economic impact
of shareholder diversification on risk-taking is non-negligible. On average, an increase in the level of
portfolio diversification, as measured by the natural log of the total number of companies in which a
company’s largest ultimate shareholder holds shares, from the top of the first to the top of the third
quartile of the distribution results in a 6.74% increase in the volatility of ROA. An increase in (1Herfindhal Index) from the first to the third quartile is associated with a 7.91% increase in the volatility of
ROA. Similarly, an increase in the number of sectors in which a company’s largest ultimate shareholder
holds shares from the first to the third quartile is associated with a 5.12% increase in the volatility of
ROA. Interestingly, diversification across firms has a greater impact on risk-taking than diversification
across sectors.
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By comparison, in the first regression, an increase in leverage from the first to the third quartile is
associated with a 4.09% increase in the volatility of ROA; an increase in ROA from the first to the third
quartile is associated with a 3.92% increase in the volatility of ROA; an increase in the rate of growth of
sales from the first to the third quartile is associated with a 4.51% increase in the volatility of ROA; and,
an increase in size from the first to the third quartile is associated with a 20.55% decrease in the volatility
of ROA.
The control variables exhibit consistent signs across the specifications. Further, their signs are
consistent with those reported in John et al. (2008). In particular, in their Table III, John et al. (2008) use
the volatility of EBITDA/Total assets as a proxy for risk-taking. In their regressions, they find leverage to
be positively but insignificantly associated with risk-taking. We find leverage to be positively and
significantly related to the volatility of ROA. They find the level of profitability at the beginning of the
sample period to be insignificantly related to risk-taking. We find that the initial ROA is positively and
significantly associated with risk-taking. They find sales growth to be positively (sometimes significantly)
related to risk-taking. We find it to be positively related to risk-taking. They find that firm size is
negatively and significantly associated with the volatility of EBITDA/Total assets. We also find size to be
negatively and significantly associated with the volatility of ROA. In their specifications, they also find
some interesting results for a number of country-level attributes. As country-level variables are not the
focus of our interest, we employ country fixed effects instead. Our country fixed effects incorporate those
effects.
[Table III goes here]
Table III presents the results for the panel regressions. In this second set of tests we include
shareholder fixed effects to control for time-invariant shareholder characteristics. The inclusion of these
fixed effects alleviates endogeneity concerns due to omitted variables. In these regressions, the
coefficients of the diversification variables can be interpreted as the impact of changes in portfolio
diversification on changes in the level of risk-taking. These results show that an increase (decline) in
portfolio diversification is associated with an increase (decline) in risk-taking. Across all specifications,
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we continue to find a statistically significant, positive relation between portfolio diversification and firm
risk-taking, providing further evidence in support of the hypothesis that well diversified shareholders are
willing to invest in riskier firms. While the statistical significance of our results is marginally diminished
when shareholder fixed effects are included among the control variables, the shareholder diversification
variables continue to remain statistically significant, with p-values of 0.017 or less.
In the panel regressions, the economic impact of changes in the level of shareholder
diversification on changes in firm risk-taking is about two-thirds the magnitude found in the crosssectional regressions. On average, an increase in the level of diversification, as measured by Ln No.
Firms, from the first to the third quartile results in a 4.28% increase in the volatility of ROA. An increase
in (1-Herfindhal Index) from the first to the third quartile of the distribution is associated with a 4.32%
increase in the volatility of ROA. An increase in Ln No. Sectors from the first to the third quartile of the
distribution is associated with a 4.16% increase in the volatility of ROA.

III.

Reverse Causality

A possible concern relates to the direction of causality in our results. Reverse causality would
require that there be some a feedback effect moving from risk-taking to portfolio diversification. In
particular, the story would go as follows. Suppose that due to a “clientele effect”, more (less) risk-averse
shareholders select firms that they expect to be relatively less (more) risky in the future, without actually
affecting the firms’ risk-taking choices. If this were the case, a firm’s level of risk-taking would be
correlated with the shareholder’s level of portfolio diversification, but the causality flows from the firm’s
riskiness to the investor’s firm choices.
Several factors limit this possibility. First, the largest shareholders in our sample control a
substantial fraction of votes, an average of 63.96% of votes across all firm-years.22 As such, it is very
realistic to assume effective (and active) control of the firm by this shareholder. As such, the risk-taking
we observe is, at least in part, a consequence of large shareholder’s choice.
22

In only 8.0% of the sample do the largest shareholders control less than 10% of their firm’s votes.
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A reader could at this point still argue that these large non-diversified shareholders are willing to
hold a large stake only because their firm is less risky. For our results to hold, however, it is also needed
that large diversified shareholders hold stakes in companies that are more risky. These companies need to
have been established by somebody in order to exist and enter the sample. We next provide evidence that
it is large diversified shareholders who are more likely to set up riskier firms (e.g., if all existing
shareholders were non-diversified, very risky firms would be less dominant).
Thus, we present a formal test for the sub-sample of start-up firms that provides further evidence
that causality runs from investors’ portfolio diversification to firm risk-taking. Among start-up firms, it is
undoubtedly the case that the founder directly influences the firm’s level of risk-taking. We identify startups based on the date of incorporation reported in Amadeus. Every firm in the sample that has a date of
incorporation between 1998 and 2003 is included in the start-up sample. To limit the impact of
survivorship bias in this set of tests, 23 we report the results using several estimates of firm-level risk: we
use not only the standard deviation of firm-level profitability over a 5-year period, as in the main tests, but
we also use the volatility of firm-level profitability over 4-, 3-, and 2-year periods. We run cross-sectional
regressions comparable to those used in the full sample tests. The results are reported in Table IV.
[Table IV goes here]
We find that portfolio diversification is positively and significantly associated with risk-taking. In
all specifications of the start-up sample, the p-value of the shareholder diversification coefficient is 0.009
or less. We also find that the economic impact of shareholder diversification on risk-taking is greater
when risk-taking is measured over shorter horizons. For example, in Panel A, in which the large
shareholder’s portfolio diversification variable is Ln No. Firms, an increase in portfolio diversification
from the first to the third quartile results in an increase of 8.7% in the volatility of firm ROA when using
a 5-year interval, compared to an increase of 10.51% when using a 2-year interval. Most likely, this result
23

It is well documented that start-up firms tend to have extremely low survivorship rates. In our regression sample,
only about 23% of the start-up firms that are still in business at the end of their second year survive through the end
of the fifth year. Among U.S. start-ups, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) document a survival rate of 34%
over the first ten years of a firm’s life. Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988) document a 38.5% survival rate in the
five years following the first inclusion in U.S. Census.
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is due to the large percentage of higher-risk start-ups that fail during their first years of existence, leaving
only less risky firms in the longer period subsamples. This result also indicates that the previously
estimated marginal effects are likely to understate the true economic significance of the impact of
portfolio diversification on risk-taking.
To summarize, we have several reasons to think that that our models capture the hypothesized
direction of causality. We present two types of evidence indicating that the large shareholders in our
sample can and do influence their firms’ risk decisions: 1) on average, our large shareholders control
63.96% of voting rights in their firms; and 2) for our subsample of start-up firms, in which large
shareholders are usually founding entrepreneurs and almost surely direct firm risk-taking decisions, the
test results are similar to the full sample results. While through these tests we attempt to confute the
possibility that reverse causality drives our results, we recognize that such possibility cannot be
completely ruled out with non-experimental data.

IV.

Other Interpretations

In this section, we assess the robustness of our results to a number of alternative variable
specifications, and we consider alternative interpretations of the relation between risk-taking and large
shareholder diversification.
A. Alternative Variables Definitions
A.1. Risk-Taking
We verify the robustness of our results to three alternatives to our specification for the dependent
variable, firm riskiness. First, we exploit the idea that firms that take more risk are less likely to survive
through time. Hence, we look at the likelihood of surviving 5 years for all firms with accounting and
ownership data for at least one year during 1999-2003. A clear advantage of this specification is that it
does not suffer from any survivorship bias, as both surviving and non-surviving companies are included
in the sample. To analyze the likelihood of survival, we employ Logit models, in which the outcome is 1
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if a company survives 5 years, and 0 otherwise. In our sample, 45.15% of firms survive a 5-year period.
The Logit results are reported in Panel A of Table V. They document lower survival rates for companies
controlled by diversified shareholders; all coefficients for portfolio diversification variables are negative
and highly significant. This is consistent with the notion that companies controlled by diversified
shareholders tend to engage in riskier projects.
[Table V goes here]
The second alternative measure of firm risk that we test is the difference between the maximum
and minimum ROA reported over the 5-year interval. Results are reported in Panel B of Table V. In
columns (1) – (3), we report results for cross-sectional tests similar to those in Table II; in columns (4)(6), we report results for panel regressions comparable to those in Table III. The results are qualitatively
similar to those reported in Tables II and III and confirm that portfolio diversification is positively
associated with risk-taking; all coefficients on portfolio diversification terms are positive and have pvalues of less than 0.019.
Third, we use the standard deviation of a firm’s return on equity (ROE), rather than the standard
deviation of ROA, as the measure of firm riskiness. ROE is the ratio of net income to shareholders’ funds.
The standard deviation of ROE reflects both the riskiness of a firm’s projects and the additional risk
induced by the use of leverage in the capital structure. The results are reported in Panel C of Table V. As
in Panel B, columns (1) – (3) report cross-sectional tests, and columns (4) – (6) report panel-regression
results. Consistent with previously reported tests, the results indicate that portfolio diversification is
positively and significantly related to firm risk-taking. Furthermore, the economic impact of portfolio
diversification on risk-taking is greater when volatility of ROE, rather than volatility of ROA, is the firm
risk-taking proxy. The larger economic impact suggests that diversified shareholders use leverage to
further increase firm risk-taking.
A.2. Portfolio Diversification
We also consider two alternative proxies for portfolio diversification. First, we employ a dummy
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variable that equals 1 if a shareholder holds more than one company in her portfolio, and zero otherwise.
Our cross-sectional test (Column (1) of Table VI) shows that this variable is highly significant in
explaining risk-taking. Consistent with our previous findings, shareholders who hold a diversified
portfolio are likely to take more risk (p-value < 0.001).
[Table VI goes here]
The second measure of investor portfolio diversification that we test is the weight of a firm in the
largest investor’s portfolio, ωij. For a totally non-diversified shareholder, her single investment will have a
weight of 1 (e.g., 100%) relative to her total wealth. For a diversified shareholder, weights will be less
than 1. For consistency with prior regressions, we use (1-ωij), so that a larger (smaller) number denotes a
more diversified (less diversified) portfolio. The results are reported in column (2) of Table VI. The
results are consistent with our previous results; increased shareholder portfolio diversification is
associated with greater firm risk-taking (p-value < 0.001).
B. Other Robustness Tests
B.1. Tunneling and Risk-Taking
An additional concern is that higher risk-taking by diversified large shareholders might simply
reflect tunneling (Bertrand et al., 2002, John et al., 2008, Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer, 2000). For example, consider a large shareholder who has fewer cash flow rights in one firm and
more rights in a second firm. This investor would instruct the company in which she has fewer cash flow
rights to take excess risk, and then she would siphon off any gains from this firm to the company in which
she has more cash flow rights (see John et al., 2008, pp. 1684-1685, for a formal discussion). As a
consequence, over time, the performance of companies in which the dominant shareholder has fewer cash
flow rights would be more volatile. If this were the case, the higher level of corporate risk-taking that we
observe is not necessarily associated with high-risk positive-NPV investments, and this strategy might
actually lead to lower growth ex-post. To rule out this possibility, we investigate the relation between
ownership concentration and risk-taking.
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The tunneling hypothesis predicts more (less) risk-taking by companies in which the largest
shareholder holds fewer (more) cash flow rights. The inclusion of an ownership variable is also useful to
compare our results with those in earlier work by Amihud and Lev (1981) and Anderson and Reeb (2003)
who found greater higher ownership concentration to be associated with more firm risk – the opposite of
what the tunneling hypothesis predicts. As shown in column (3) of Table VI, we find a positive and
significant relation between ownership concentration and risk-taking (p-value < 0.001).24 This result is
inconsistent with tunneling.25 While consistent with the results in Amihud and Lev (1981), our results are
inconsistent with their interpretation, which is that the presence of blockholders, whom they assume to be
more diversified investors, is associated with more risk-taking. We have shown earlier that larger
blockholders tend to be relatively less diversified than smaller blockholders. The positive relation
between ownership concentration and risk-taking is, however, consistent with empirical evidence that
ownership and incentive schemes with convex payoffs induce insiders to take on more risk (e.g., Agrawal
and Mandelker, 1987, Guay, 1999). For our purposes, the important finding is that the relation between
risk-taking and portfolio diversification is unchanged after controlling for ownership concentration. The
coefficient on the portfolio diversification variable is positive, and both statistically and economically
significant.
B.2. Firm-Level Diversification and Risk-Taking
It might be argued that the association between large shareholders’ portfolio diversification and
firm risk is actually the result of the level of diversification at the firm-level. A firm with an overall welldiversified set of risky projects might have low volatility of profitability, even though the individual
projects are high-risk and high NPV investments. In this situation, the low volatility of profitability would
not be associated with low economic growth. To rule out the possibility that low firm risk is driven
primarily by diversification at the firm level, rather than by investors’ portfolio diversification, we add a
24

Similarly, in unreported tests, we find less risk-taking in companies located further down in a pyramid, which are
more likely to have a high discrepancy between ultimate control and ultimate ownership.

25

This result is unchanged if we focus on diversified large shareholders for these tests.
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control for the number of 4-digit SIC sectors in which a company operates. The results are reported in
column (4) of Table VI. As expected, we find that firm-level diversification is associated with lower
volatility of ROA. More importantly, after controlling for firm-level diversification, we continue to find
that greater investor portfolio diversification is associated with more risk-taking at the firm level.
B.3. Institutional Determinants of Risk-Taking
In our earlier cross-sectional tests, we included country fixed effects to control for the effect of
any country-specific factors that influence firm risk-taking choices. However, the analysis of which
factors have an impact on risk-taking is potentially interesting. In this section, we include two variables
representing the quality of institutions within each country; security of property rights and the level of
earnings management.
As proxy for the security of property rights, we include the revised Anti-Director Rights index,
which “is formed by summing: (1) vote by mail; (2) shares not deposited; (3) cumulative voting; (4)
oppressed minority; (5) pre-emptive rights; and (6) capital to call a meeting.” This index is taken from
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). As a proxy for the quality of accounting
information we use the Aggregate Earnings Management Score, computed as the average rank across
“the country’s median ratio of the firm-level standard deviations of operating income and operating cash
flow,” “the country’s Spearman correlation between the change in accruals and the change in cash flow
from operations,” “the country’s median ratio of the absolute value of accruals and the absolute value of
the cash flow from operations” and the “number of “small profits” divided by the number of “small
losses” for each country.” This index is taken from Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz (2006). It is built such that
a higher value denotes a higher degree of earnings management.
The results reported in column (5) of Table VI show that risk-taking is significantly higher in
countries that provide stronger protection of shareholder rights. Further, we find that earnings
management is negatively correlated with risk-taking. Both results are consistent with earlier evidence in
John et al. (2008). More importantly, shareholder diversification remains positively and significantly
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related to risk-taking after controlling for these two specific institutional differences across countries.
B.4. Non-U.K. Firms
As we pointed out earlier, the ownership data in Amadeus for the U.K. appears to be relatively
noisy compared to the data from other countries in the sample. While this is likely to have no effect other
than bias against finding significant results, we would like to confirm that this data problem does not
affect our central finding. For this purpose, we re-run our tests excluding U.K. firms. The results are
reported in column (6) of Table VI. For the non-U.K. sample, we continue to find a positive and
significant association between shareholder diversification and risk-taking. Results are similar to those
reported for the whole sample. Thus, we conclude that the noise introduced by the inclusion of U.K. firms
does not impact our main result.
B.5. Majority-Controlled Firms
Another potential weakness in our argument is that the largest shareholders may not always have
actual control over the risk-taking decisions made by firms. Among the largest shareholders who control
at least 50% of a firm’s voting rights, it is more likely that the large shareholder can and does influence
the firm’s risk-taking decisions. Thus, in column (7) of Table VI, we show results of the cross-sectional
regression run on a subsample that includes only companies in which the largest shareholder controls
50% of voting rights or more. The results confirm our previous evidence: there is a positive and
significant relation between portfolio diversification and risk-taking.

V.

Conclusions

It is commonly assumed in the economics and finance literature that risk-averse insiders will
avoid firm-level risk because their wealth is concentrated in a few firms. For example, John et al. (2008,
p. 1683) argue that:
“…[t]he resources available to dominant insiders, including both their equity ownership and the
private benefits of control, are inevitably concentrated within the firms they control, that is,
because of their large exposure to these firms, these dominant insiders are likely to direct the
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corporations they control to invest more conservatively than they would if they held a
diversified portfolio of firms.”
In this literature, because of data limitations, authors have traditionally used ownership
concentration to proxy for portfolio diversification, despite the lack of hard evidence supporting any
assumptions about diversification. They have reached mixed conclusions. As a preliminary step, we
reconstruct the portfolios of shareholders who hold the largest equity position in privately-held and
publicly-traded European firms. Our ownership data come from the Amadeus dataset, and our total
sample comprises 1,315,558 shareholder-year observations, including 643,856 firms, over the period
1999-2003. These new data allow us to revisit some standard assumptions and thus contribute to this
literature. Although our evidence indicates that, on average, a company’s largest shareholder is highly
undiversified, we observe great heterogeneity in the degree of diversification across shareholders. We
show that there are many cases in which large shareholders hold well diversified portfolios. While the
large shareholders who hold smaller equity stakes tend to hold more diversified portfolios, this correlation
is relatively low. These findings will be useful to future researchers in making appropriate assumptions of
two types: first, assumptions regarding large shareholder diversification; and second, assumptions
regarding the trade-off between holding a reasonably diversified portfolio and holding a dominant
position in a relatively large firm.
We exploit the heterogeneity in large shareholders’ portfolio diversification to investigate the
impact of large shareholder diversification on corporate risk-taking. We report strong statistical evidence
that firms controlled by diversified large shareholders are more likely to undertake riskier projects than
firms controlled by non-diversified investors. The economic impact of large shareholder diversification
on risk-taking is also economically meaningful.
We also show that the positive association between portfolio diversification and corporate risktaking is robust to the inclusion of shareholder fixed-effects which alleviates a possible omitted variable
bias. Although concerns of endogeneity cannot be eliminated when using non-experimental data, we use
several approaches to ensure that our results capture the true direction of causality. First, we find that, on
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average, large shareholders control 64% of votes, and thus they have effective control over corporate
decisions. Second, since owners in start-up firms are likely to be founding entrepreneurs, and there is no
doubt that they control firm decisions, we test a subsample of start-up firms to confirm our result. In this
subsample, we find even stronger evidence that investments undertaken by firms started by large
diversified founders are riskier than investments undertaken by firms started by non diversified founders.
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Table I. Descriptive statistics
No. Firms is the total number of firms in which a company’s largest ultimate shareholder (e.g., the ultimate
shareholder controlling the largest fraction of voting rights in the firm) holds shares, directly or indirectly, in a given
year, across all countries in our sample. The Herfindhal Index is the sum of the squared values of the weight that
. No. Sectors is the number of 4-digit primary SIC
each investment has in a largest shareholder’s portfolio, ∑
code sectors for the firms in the largest shareholder’s portfolio. Diversification Dummy is a binary variable that
equals 1 if a shareholder holds more than one company in her portfolio, and zero otherwise. σ(ROA) is the 5-year
volatility of a firm’s country-adjusted return on assets σ(ROA), where ROA is the ratio of EBIT to total assets.
Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets, where total debt includes non-current liabilities (long
term debt and other non-current liabilities) and current liabilities (loans, accounts payable, and others). Sales Growth
is the annual growth rate of sales. Size is the natural log of total assets, expressed in 1999 prices, where total assets is
the sum of fixed and current assets. Ultimate Ownership measures the cash flow rights of the largest ultimate
of the shares of firm Y, which owns a
shareholder. In particular, assume that if a shareholder i owns a fraction
of the shares of firm J, then i will be entitled to a fraction
of the cash flows of J. Ultimate
fraction
of the
Control measures the voting rights of the largest ultimate shareholder. If a shareholder i owns a fraction
of the shares of firm J, we measure shareholder i’s control over voting
shares of firm Y, which owns a fraction
and
.
rights in J by the weakest link along the chain, i.e., the minimum of

Panel A: Country distribution of observations
Country
No. Firms
%
Country
Austria
476
0.38 Latvia
Belgium
3,347
2.71 Liechtenstein
Bulgaria
468
0.38 Lithuania
Croatia
813
0.66 Luxembourg
Czech Republic
191
0.15 Netherlands
Denmark
4,492
3.63 Norway
Estonia
204
0.16 Poland
Finland
1,152
0.93 Portugal
France
31,055
25.12 Russian Federation
Germany
2,518
2.04 Slovak Republic
Greece
5,128
4.15 Slovenia
Hungary
4
0.00 Spain
Iceland
12
0.01 Sweden
Ireland
48
0.04 Switzerland
Italy
2,965
2.40 United Kingdom
Overall
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No. Firms
%
261
0.21
2
0.00
285
0.23
2
0.00
3,711
3.00
4,526
3.66
1,622
1.31
1,791
1.45
1,001
0.81
13
0.01
9
0.01
19,351
15.65
4,269
3.45
63
0.05
33,863
27.39
123,642 100.00

Table I. Descriptive statistics (Cont’d)
Panel B: Summary statistics for the main dependent and independent variables
Variable

Interquartile
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
range
Investor-level statistics (82,502 investor-year observations)

No. Firms
Ln No. Firms
1-Herfindhal Index
No. Sectors
Ln No. Sectors
Diversification Dummy

σ(ROA)
Leverage
ROA
Sales Growth
Size
Ultimate Ownership
Ultimate Control

3.995
1
15.961
2
0.615
0
0.906
1.099
0.174
0
0.264
0.391
2.129
1
5.004
1
0.367
0
0.655
0.693
0.435
0
0.496
1
Firm-level statistics (123,642 firm-year observations)
0.055
0.044
0.042
0.047
0.675
0.705
0.220
0.311
0.071
0.060
0.102
0.099
0.251
0.090
0.889
0.451
10.246
10.038
1.404
1.729
62.287
57.420
34.738
65.000
63.964
59.000
33.369
58.000
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Min.

Max.

1
0
0
1
0
0

972
6.879
0.985
232
5.447
1

0.000
0.000
-0.410
-0.978
6.659
0.000
0.010

0.510
1.018
0.513
3.024
14.680
100
100

Table II. Cross-sectional regressions
This table reports OLS regression results. The dependent variable is the volatility of a firm’s country-adjusted return
on assets σ(ROA)×100, where ROA is the ratio of EBIT to total assets. We calculate the standard deviation of the
country-adjusted returns of each firm over the entire sample period (1999-2007), requiring a minimum of 5
observations, following John et al. (2008). Ln No. Firms is the natural log of the total number of firms in which a
company’s largest ultimate shareholder (e.g., the ultimate shareholder controlling the largest fraction of voting rights
in the firm) holds shares, directly or indirectly, in a given year, across all countries in our sample. The Herfindhal
Index is the sum of the squared values of the weight that each investment has in a largest shareholder’s portfolio,
∑
. Ln No. Sectors is the natural log of the number of 4-digit primary SIC code sectors for the firms in the
largest shareholder’s portfolio. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets where total debt includes
non-current liabilities (long term debt and other non-current liabilities) and current liabilities (loans, creditors and
others). Sales Growth is the annual growth rate of sales. Size is the natural log of total assets, expressed in 1999
prices, where total assets is the sum of fixed and current assets. All independent variables are measured at the first
year-end of the period over which the volatility of earnings is measured. All cross-sectional tests include country
and industry fixed effects. P-values, adjusted for heteroskedasticity, are reported in brackets below the coefficients.
The economic significance of the portfolio diversification variables is reported beneath the p-values (in bold); this
number is the percentage change in the value of the dependent variable in response to an increase from the first to
the third quartile of the portfolio diversification variables.

Ln No. Firms

(1)
0.171***
[0.000]
6.740%

(2)

(1-Herfindhal Index)

0.675***
[0.000]
7.913%

Ln No. Sectors

Leverage
ROA
Sales Growth
Size
Intercept
Country fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Adj. R-squared
No. of observations

(3)

0.706***
[0.000]
2.103***
[0.000]
0.155***
[0.000]
-0.636***
[0.000]
9.670***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.126
46,692

0.519***
[0.000]
2.959***
[0.000]
0.148***
[0.000]
-0.589***
[0.000]
9.234***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.125
45,892
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0.206***
[0.000]
5.123%
0.714***
[0.000]
2.097***
[0.000]
0.158***
[0.000]
-0.630***
[0.000]
9.676***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.125
46,692

Table III. Panel regressions
This table reports OLS regression results. The dependent variable is the volatility of a firm’s country-adjusted return
on assets σ(ROA)×100, where ROA is the ratio of EBIT to total assets. We calculate the standard deviation of the
country-adjusted returns of each firm over 5-year partially overlapping periods (1999-2003, 2000-2004, 2001-2005,
2002-2006, and 2003-2007). Ln No. Firms is the natural log of the total number of firms in which a company’s
largest ultimate shareholder (e.g., the ultimate shareholder controlling the largest fraction of voting rights in the
firm) holds shares, directly or indirectly, in a given year, across all countries in our sample. The Herfindhal Index is
the sum of the squared values of the weight that each investment has in a largest shareholder’s portfolio, ∑
.
Ln No. Sectors is the natural log of the number of 4-digit primary SIC code sectors for the firms in the largest
shareholder’s portfolio. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets where total debt includes noncurrent liabilities (long term debt and other non-current liabilities) and current liabilities (loans, creditors and
others). Sales Growth is the annual growth rate of sales. Size is the natural log of total assets, expressed in 1999
prices, where total assets is the sum of fixed and current assets. All independent variables are measured at the first
year-end of the period over which the volatility of earnings is measured. All regressions include shareholder and
year fixed effects. P-values, adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the company level, are reported in
brackets below the coefficients. The economic significance of the portfolio diversification variables is reported
beneath the p-values (in bold); this number is the percentage change in the value of the dependent variable in
response to an increase from the first to the third quartile of the portfolio diversification variables.

Ln No. Firms

(1)
0.092**
[0.011]
4.279%

(2)

(1-Herfindhal Index)

0.316**
[0.017]
4.323%

Ln No. Sectors

Leverage
ROA
Sales Growth
Size
Intercept
Investor fixed-effects
Time fixed effects
Adj. R-squared
No. of observations

(3)

1.012***
[0.000]
-0.752**
[0.010]
0.092***
[0.000]
-0.713***
[0.000]
11.532***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.664
123,642

1.008***
[0.000]
-0.653**
[0.025]
0.095***
[0.000]
-0.712***
[0.000]
11.408***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.655
121,851
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0.128***
[0.003]
4.161%
1.012***
[0.000]
-0.752**
[0.010]
0.092***
[0.000]
-0.713***
[0.000]
11.549***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.665
123,642

Table IV. Cross-sectional regressions for start-up firms
This table reports OLS regression results for the subsample of start-ups. The dependent variable is the volatility of a
firm’s country-adjusted return on assets σ(ROA)×100, where ROA is the ratio of EBIT to total assets. In column (1),
volatility is measured over a 5-year period; in column (2), it is measured over a 4-year period; in column (3), it is
measured over a 3-year period; in column (4), it is measured over a 2-year period. Ln No. Firms is the natural log of
the total number of firms in which a company’s largest ultimate shareholder (e.g., the ultimate shareholder
controlling the largest fraction of voting rights in the firm) holds shares, directly or indirectly, in a given year, across
all countries in our sample. The Herfindhal Index is the sum of the squared values of the weight that each investment
has in a largest shareholder’s portfolio, ∑
. Ln No. Sectors is the natural log of the number of 4-digit primary
SIC code sectors for the firms in the largest shareholder’s portfolio. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to
total assets where total debt includes non-current liabilities (long term debt and other non-current liabilities) and
current liabilities (loans, creditors and others). Sales Growth is the annual growth rate of sales. Size is the natural log
of total assets, expressed in 1999 prices, where total assets is the sum of fixed and current assets. All independent
variables are measured at the first year-end of the period over which the volatility of earnings is measured. All crosssectional tests include country and industry fixed effects. P-values, adjusted for heteroskedasticity, are reported in
brackets below the coefficients. The economic significance of the portfolio diversification variables is reported
beneath the p-values (in bold); this number is the percentage change in the value of the dependent variable in
response to an increase from the first to the third quartile of the portfolio diversification variables.

Panel A: Log No. Firms as a measure of portfolio diversification

Span for the measurement of the volatility (years)
Ln No. Firms

Leverage
ROA
Sales Growth
Size
Intercept
Country fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Adj. R-squared
No. of observations

(1)
5
0.179***
[0.001]
8.700%
0.617*
[0.058]
-2.611**
[0.023]
0.324***
[0.000]
-0.920***
[0.000]
12.263***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.122
3,489
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(2)
4
0.237***
[0.000]
10.886%
0.783***
[0.002]
-1.504*
[0.096]
0.240***
[0.000]
-0.906***
[0.000]
12.119***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.117
5,911

(3)
3
0.237***
[0.000]
10.287%
0.612***
[0.006]
-1.439*
[0.069]
0.234***
[0.000]
-0.957***
[0.000]
12.680***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.107
9,475

(4)
2
0.231***
[0.000]
10.513%
0.325*
[0.082]
-0.366
[0.584]
0.201***
[0.000]
-0.935***
[0.000]
13.147***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.089
15,138

Table IV. Cross-sectional regressions for start-up firms (Cont’d)
Panel B: (1-Herfindhal Index) as a measure of portfolio diversification

Span for the measurement of the volatility (years)
(1-Herfindhal Index)

Leverage
ROA
Sales Growth
Size
Intercept
Country fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Adj. R-squared
No. of observations

(1)
5
0.607***
[0.009]
8.238%
0.447
[0.179]
-1.39
[0.242]
0.305***
[0.000]
-0.856***
[0.000]
10.447***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.113
3,344
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(2)
4
0.948***
[0.000]
12.404%
0.537**
[0.039]
0.125
[0.894]
0.226***
[0.000]
-0.827***
[0.000]
10.999***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.106
5,672

(3)
3
0.969***
[0.000]
12.679%
0.418*
[0.060]
0.037
[0.964]
0.214***
[0.000]
-0.881***
[0.000]
11.807***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.100
9,072

(4)
2
0.933***
[0.000]
12.303%
0.12
[0.526]
1.362**
[0.046]
0.176***
[0.000]
-0.859***
[0.000]
12.443***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.088
14,472

Table IV. Cross-sectional regressions for start-up firms (Cont’d)
Panel C: Log No. Sectors as a measure of portfolio diversification

Span for the measurement of the volatility (years)
Ln No. Sectors

Leverage
ROA
Sales Growth
Size
Intercept
Country fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Adj. R-squared
No. of observations

(1)
5
0.238***
[0.000]
7.854%
0.633*
[0.052]
-2.628**
[0.023]
0.326***
[0.000]
-0.918***
[0.000]
12.343***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.122
3,489
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(2)
4
0.315***
[0.000]
9.371%
0.793***
[0.002]
-1.525*
[0.092]
0.243***
[0.000]
-0.905***
[0.000]
12.197***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.117
5,911

(3)
3
0.326***
[0.000]
9.890%
0.621***
[0.005]
-1.449*
[0.067]
0.236***
[0.000]
-0.956***
[0.000]
12.758***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.107
9,475

(4)
2
0.343***
[0.000]
9.398%
0.341*
[0.067]
-0.369
[0.581]
0.200***
[0.000]
-0.935***
[0.000]
13.218***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.090
15,138

Table V: Robustness tests: Alternative definitions of the dependent variable
In Panel A, we report the results for Logit regressions analyzing the likelihood of survival over a 5-year period. In Panel B, the
dependent variable is the difference between the maximum and minimum values of firm’s country-adjusted return on assets,
×100. ROA is the ratio of EBIT to total assets. In Panel C, the dependent variable is the volatility of a firm’s country-adjusted
return on equity σ(ROE)×100. ROE is defined as the ratio of net income to total shareholders’ funds. In Panels B and C, columns
(1) - (3) report the results for cross-sectional regressions; Columns (4) - (6) report results for panel regressions. Ln No. Firms is
the natural log of the total number of firms in which a company’s largest ultimate shareholder (e.g., the ultimate shareholder
controlling the largest fraction of voting rights in the firm) holds shares, directly or indirectly, in a given year, across all countries
in our sample. The Herfindhal Index is the sum of the squared values of the weight that each investment has in a largest
. Ln No. Sectors is the natural log of the number of 4-digit primary SIC code sectors for the
shareholder’s portfolio, ∑
firms in the largest shareholder’s portfolio. Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets where total debt includes
non-current liabilities (long term debt and other non-current liabilities) and current liabilities (loans, creditors and others). Sales
Growth is the annual growth rate of sales. Size is the natural log of total assets, expressed in 1999 prices, where total assets is the
sum of fixed and current assets. All independent variables are measured at the first year-end of the period over which the
volatility of earnings is measured. All cross-sectional tests include country and industry fixed effects. All panel regressions
include shareholder and year fixed effects. P-values, adjusted for heteroskedasticity, are reported in brackets below the
coefficients. In the panel regressions, standard errors are also adjusted for clustering at the company level. The economic
significance of the portfolio diversification variables is reported beneath the p-values (in bold); this number is the percentage
change in the value of the dependent variable in response to an increase from the first to the third quartile of the portfolio
diversification variables.

Panel A: Likelihood of survival
(1)
(2)
Ln No. Firms

-0.082***
[0.000]
-2.671%

(1-Herfindhal Index)

-0.271***
[0.000]
-6.700%

Ln No. Sectors

Leverage
ROA
Sales Growth
Size
Intercept
Country fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Pseudo R-squared
No. of observations

(3)

-0.087***
[0.006]
1.746***
[0.000]
0.040***
[0.000]
0.210***
[0.000]
-3.345***
[0.000]

-0.055*
[0.086]
1.705***
[0.000]
0.039***
[0.000]
0.197***
[0.000]
-3.271***
[0.000]

-0.097***
[0.000]
-2.102%
-0.091***
[0.004]
1.749***
[0.000]
0.039***
[0.000]
0.207***
[0.000]
-3.337***
[0.000]

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

0.098
103,403

0.097
101,055

0.098
103,403
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Table V: Robustness tests: Alternative definitions of the dependent variable (Cont’d)
Panel B: Max(ROA)-Min(ROA)

Ln No. Firms

(1-Herfindhal Index)

Cross-sectional tests
(1)
(2)
0.433***
[0.000]
6.434%
1.665***
[0.000]
7.380%

Ln No. Sectors

Leverage
ROA
Sales Growth
Size
Intercept
Country fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Investor fixed-effects
Time fixed effects
Adj. R-squared
No. of observations

1.826***
[0.000]
5.990***
[0.000]
0.429***
[0.000]
-1.650***
[0.000]
24.007***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
No
No
0.123
46,692

1.373***
[0.000]
8.223***
[0.000]
0.408***
[0.000]
-1.526***
[0.000]
22.920***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
No
No
0.122
45,892
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(3)

0.528***
[0.000]
4.950%
1.846***
[0.000]
5.972***
[0.000]
0.435***
[0.000]
-1.636***
[0.000]
24.041***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
No
No
0.122
46,692

Panel regressions
(4)
(5)
0.213**
[0.013]
3.774%
0.741**
[0.019]
3.916%

2.453***
[0.000]
-1.362**
[0.045]
0.218***
[0.000]
-1.716***
[0.000]
27.794***
[0.000]
No
No
Yes
Yes
0.666
123,642

2.442***
[0.000]
-1.092
[0.107]
0.226***
[0.000]
-1.714***
[0.000]
27.526***
[0.000]
No
No
Yes
Yes
0.656
121,851

(6)

0.293***
[0.004]
3.276%
2.454***
[0.000]
-1.361**
[0.045]
0.218***
[0.000]
-1.717***
[0.000]
27.834***
[0.000]
No
No
Yes
Yes
0.666
123,642

Table V: Robustness tests: Alternative definitions of the dependent variable (Cont’d)
Panel C: σ(ROE)

Ln No. Firms

(1-Herfindhal Index)

Cross-sectional tests
(1)
(2)
1.506***
[0.000]
11.380%
6.260***
[0.000]
14.095%

Ln No. Sectors

Leverage
ROE
Sales Growth
Size
Intercept
Country fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Investor fixed-effects
Time fixed effects
Adj. R-squared
No. of observations

56.957*** 54.332***
[0.000]
[0.000]
4.505***
2.626***
[0.000]
[0.001]
-0.102
-0.023
[0.493]
[0.876]
-0.185
-0.04
[0.280]
[0.814]
-19.947*** -20.164***
[0.000]
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
0.171
0.157
44,294
43,533
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(3)

1.767***
[0.000]
8.424%
57.035***
[0.000]
4.514***
[0.000]
-0.084
[0.569]
-0.115
[0.499]
-20.064***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
No
No
0.17
44,294

Panel regressions
(4)
(5)
0.632**
[0.015]
5.665%
2.167**
[0.041]
5.729%

60.272***
[0.000]
2.184***
[0.000]
-0.335**
[0.013]
-1.932***
[0.000]
2.287
[0.277]
No
No
Yes
Yes
0.657
119,292

60.116***
[0.000]
2.207***
[0.000]
-0.327**
[0.016]
-1.920***
[0.000]
1.944
[0.336]
No
No
Yes
Yes
0.637
117,588

(6)

0.818**
[0.010]
5.125%
60.278***
[0.000]
2.183***
[0.000]
-0.336**
[0.013]
-1.932***
[0.000]
2.371
[0.258]
No
No
Yes
Yes
0.657
119,292

Table VI: Other robustness tests
The dependent variable is the volatility of a firm’s country-adjusted return on assets σ(ROA)×100, where ROA is the ratio of EBIT to total assets. We calculate
the standard deviation of the country-adjusted returns of each firm over the entire sample period (1999-2007), requiring a minimum of 5 observations,
following John et al. (2008). Ln No. Firms is the natural log of the total number of firms in which a company’s largest ultimate shareholder (e.g., the ultimate
shareholder controlling the largest fraction of voting rights in the firm) holds shares, directly or indirectly, in a given year, across all countries in our sample.
Diversification Dummy is a binary variable that equals 1 if a shareholder holds more than one company in her portfolio, and zero otherwise. Fraction of Wealth
the ratio of the value of the investment made in that given firm over the shareholder’s total wealth. Ultimate Ownership measures the cash flow rights of the
largest ultimate shareholder. In particular, assume that if a shareholder i owns a fraction
of the shares of firm Y, which owns a fraction
of the shares of
firm J, then i will be entitled to a fraction
of the cash flows of J. Ln No. Sectors is the natural log of the number of 4-digit primary SIC code
sectors for the firms in the largest shareholder’s portfolio. Anti-Self-Dealing Index “is formed by summing: (1) vote by mail; (2) shares not deposited; (3)
cumulative voting; (4) oppressed minority; (5) pre-emptive rights; and (6) capital to call a meeting.” This index is taken from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, and Shleifer (2008). Aggregate Earnings Management Score is the average rank across “the country’s median ratio of the firm-level standard deviations
of operating income and operating cash flow,” “the country’s Spearman correlation between the change in accruals and the change in cash flow from operations,”
“the country’s median ratio of the absolute value of accruals and the absolute value of the cash flow from operations” and the “number of “small profits” divided
by the number of “small losses” for each country.” This index is taken from Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz (2006). Leverage is defined as the ratio of total debt to
total assets where total debt includes non-current liabilities (long term debt and other non-current liabilities) and current liabilities (loans, creditors and others).
Sales Growth is the annual growth rate of sales. Size is the natural log of total assets, expressed in 1999 prices, where total assets is the sum of fixed and current
assets. All independent variables are measured at the first year-end of the period over which the volatility of earnings is measured. All cross-sectional tests
include country and industry fixed effects. P-values, adjusted for heteroskedasticity, are reported in brackets below the coefficients. The economic significance of
the portfolio diversification variables is reported beneath the p-values (in bold); this number is the percentage change in the value of the dependent variable in
response to an increase from the first to the third quartile of the portfolio diversification variables.

Type of
Robustness Test:

(1)

(2)

Different
proxy for
portfolio
diversification

Different
proxy for
portfolio
diversification

Ln No. Firms

Diversification Dummy

(1-Fraction of Wealth)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

Tunneling

Firm-level
diversification

Institutional
determinants
of risk
taking

Non-U.K.
firms

Majority
Control
(e.g. > 50%)

0.210***
[0.000]
8.278%

0.165***
[0.000]
6.473%

0.188***
[0.000]
7.961%

0.187***
[0.000]
6.874%

0.177***
[0.000]
5.066%

0.568***
[0.000]
10.190%
0.649***
[0.000]
10.826%
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Ultimate Ownership

0.004***
[0.000]

Ln No. Sectors

-0.141***
[0.000]

Anti-Self-Dealing Index

1.775***
[0.000]

Aggregate Earnings
Management Score
Leverage
ROA
Sales Growth
Size
Intercept
Country fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Adj. R-squared
No. of observations

0.729***
[0.000]
2.182***
[0.000]
0.153***
[0.000]
-0.627***
[0.000]
9.358***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.126
46,692

-0.041
[0.672]
4.605***
[0.000]
0.129***
[0.000]
-0.546***
[0.000]
9.076***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.132
44,671

0.682***
[0.000]
2.114***
[0.000]
0.154***
[0.000]
-0.638***
[0.000]
9.339***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.126
46,692
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0.671***
[0.000]
2.084***
[0.000]
0.151***
[0.000]
-0.626***
[0.000]
9.704***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.128
42,435

-0.032***
[0.000]
0.768***
[0.000]
2.391***
[0.000]
0.168***
[0.000]
-0.606***
[0.000]
9.311***
[0.000]
No
Yes
0.099
42,210

0.480***
[0.000]
2.463***
[0.000]
0.123***
[0.000]
-0.554***
[0.000]
9.016***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.124
34,941

0.876***
[0.000]
2.463***
[0.000]
0.185***
[0.000]
-0.623***
[0.000]
9.439***
[0.000]
Yes
Yes
0.119
32,483

Appendix A. Selection criteria

A. OWNERSHIP DATA
Initial ownership database (1999-2003)

- Cross-held companies
- Shareholders disclosed in Amadeus as
“aggregate categories”
- State-owned firms

Total
1,315,558 shareholderyears

B. ACCOUNTING DATA
Initial accounting dataset for non-financial
companies with at least one year of ROA
data (1999-2007)

Total
1,754,714 firm-years

- Firms with less than 5 years of ROA
data

-546,048 firm-years

- 2,890 firm-years
- 41,878 shareholder-years
- 24,482 firm-years

Total Number of Observations

1,198,372 shareholderyears
645,394 firm-years
(243,856 firms)

Total Number of Observations

C. MERGED PANEL
Merged ownership (1999-2003) and ROA volatility data (1999-2007)
-

Total
332,301 firm-years
(50,049 firms)
- 69,718 firm-years

Firms with missing data for the main control variables
Final sample
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1,208,666 firm-years
(168,193 firms)

123,642 firm-years
(46,692 firms)

